Listed below are my projects, completed and preliminary. Click the paper title to see more details where available, including abstracts and all related links.

Working papers

Abstract: Sellers often have power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if share of such "naive" consumers is not too large then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the high-type seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.

Work in progress

Abstract: The paper studies a continuous-time communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. An expert of unknown competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of his forecast about an outcome that is revealed at time T. A competent expert may at some time before T receive an inside knowledge about the outcome, which is not available to an incompetent expert. We find that all equilibria in a sufficiently general class have the following properties: a) earlier reports are more credible, b) expert's reputation takes a hit after any report, and c) an exogenous ban on reports at some times may increase the credibility of report, but creates a delay in signal transmission.

Unpublished manuscripts

[pdf - June 2013]
Abstract: This paper looks into the question of optimal design of communication network within a company. The principal trade-off in managerial decisionmaking is often identified as adaptation to local environment versus coordination with other divisions within a firm. This trade-off creates a conflict of interests between managers of different departments and prevents them from communicating truthfully with each other. We explore different communication structures in order to optimize the communication process and find out that if the divisions differ sufficiently in size and the smaller division depends heavily on coordination then sequential communication with larger firm as leader is more preferable by the firm, while with divisions of similar sizes simultaneous communication yields better performance.