Listed below are my projects, completed and preliminary. Click the paper title to see more details where available, including abstracts and all related links.

Working papers

[pdf] [RePEc] [SSRN]
Abstract: Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such “naive” consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.
Abstract: The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. An expert of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of his forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the expert's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. Reputation of a silent expert, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.

Work in progress

Abstract: This paper explores a model of dynamic signaling with obstinent receivers. Once such receivers rule out some possibility, they never revisit this belief. It is known that scope for signaling in such model is severely limited. This paper, however, shows that informative and payoff-relevant signaling can occur even with obstinent receivers. Further, it can only happen through attrition, when the weakest type gradually drops over time the attempts to blend in with stronger types. We also show that full information revelation may be possible asymptotically, but that conclusion depends crucially on the assumptions about the state space.
Abstract: The paper explores social learning in a decentralized setting. We study a model where consumers sequentially arrive at the market, make a one-time purchase decision regarding a product of uncertain quality, and leave a review for subsequent consumers based on their experience with the product. When writing a review, consumer cares about welfare of all future consumers, and thus wants to induce socially optimal amount of experimentation with the product. This conflicts with purchasing decisions which maximize only own utility. This leads to reviews being deliberately noisy in order to spur experimentation. We characterize the informational content of reviews and show that communication has interval structure in these conditions.

Unpublished manuscripts

[pdf - June 2013]
Abstract: This paper looks into the question of optimal design of communication network within a company. The principal trade-off in managerial decisionmaking is often identified as adaptation to local environment versus coordination with other divisions within a firm. This trade-off creates a conflict of interests between managers of different departments and prevents them from communicating truthfully with each other. We explore different communication structures in order to optimize the communication process and find out that if the divisions differ sufficiently in size and the smaller division depends heavily on coordination then sequential communication with larger firm as leader is more preferable by the firm, while with divisions of similar sizes simultaneous communication yields better performance.