Research

Listed below are my projects, completed and preliminary. Click the paper title to see more details where available, including abstracts and all related links.



Working papers

[pdf] [SSRN] [RePEc] [BibTeX]
Abstract: Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such “naive” consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.
[pdf] [SSRN] [RePeC] [BibTeX]
This paper was formerly circulated as "Experts, Quacks and Fortune-Tellers: Dynamic Cheap Talk with Career Concerns".
Abstract: The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.


Work in progress

Abstract: This paper explores a model of dynamic signaling with obstinent receivers. Once such receivers rule out some possibility, they never revisit this belief. It is known that scope for signaling in such model is severely limited. This paper, however, shows that informative and payoff-relevant signaling can occur even with obstinent receivers. Further, it can only happen through attrition, when the weakest type gradually drops over time the attempts to blend in with stronger types. We also show that full information revelation may be possible asymptotically, but that conclusion depends crucially on the assumptions about the state space.
Abstract: This paper studies strategic communication in the context of social learning. Product reviews are used by consumers to learn product quality, but in order to write a review, a consumer must be convinced to purchase the item first. When reviewers care about welfare of future consumers, this leads to a conflict: a reviewer today wants the future consumers to purchase the item even when this comes at a loss to them, so that more information is revealed for the consumers that come after. We show that due to this conflict, communication via reviews is inevitably noisy in this setting, regardless of whether the reviewers can commit to a communication strategy or have to resort to cheap talk. We further show that in the latter case, the communication must necessarily have the interval structure, meaning that the noise persists even when the conflict between the reviewers and future consumers vanishes.


Unpublished manuscripts

[pdf - June 2013]
Abstract: This paper looks into the question of optimal design of communication network within a company. The principal trade-off in managerial decisionmaking is often identified as adaptation to local environment versus coordination with other divisions within a firm. This trade-off creates a conflict of interests between managers of different departments and prevents them from communicating truthfully with each other. We explore different communication structures in order to optimize the communication process and find out that if the divisions differ sufficiently in size and the smaller division depends heavily on coordination then sequential communication with larger firm as leader is more preferable by the firm, while with divisions of similar sizes simultaneous communication yields better performance.