Listed below are my projects, completed and preliminary. Click the paper title to see more details where available, including abstracts and all related links.

Working papers

[pdf] [RePEc] [SSRN]
Abstract: Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such “naive” consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.
Abstract: The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. An expert of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of his forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the expert's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. Reputation of a silent expert, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.

Work in progress

Abstract: This paper explores a model of dynamic signaling through observable actions. It asks the question of how dynamic signaling can proceed in settings when complete separation is not possible in any single period. It shows that payoff-relevant signaling can only take place via attrition, when the weakest type gradually drops over time the attempts to blend in with stronger types. It also shows that conclusions regarding whether full information revelation is asymptotically possible depend crucially on the assumptions about the state space.

Unpublished manuscripts

[pdf - June 2013]
Abstract: This paper looks into the question of optimal design of communication network within a company. The principal trade-off in managerial decisionmaking is often identified as adaptation to local environment versus coordination with other divisions within a firm. This trade-off creates a conflict of interests between managers of different departments and prevents them from communicating truthfully with each other. We explore different communication structures in order to optimize the communication process and find out that if the divisions differ sufficiently in size and the smaller division depends heavily on coordination then sequential communication with larger firm as leader is more preferable by the firm, while with divisions of similar sizes simultaneous communication yields better performance.